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Homosexuals have long been the targets of both government-
approved and private discrimination. While it appears that the
virulence of the societal disapproval directed at them has
diminished somewhat in recent years, there is no doubt that, even
today, public identification of an individual as a homosexual is a
grave disadvantage. Those who wish to engage in acts of sexual
intimacy with members of their own sex are confronted by statutes
in many states which make it a crime to engage in almost all of the
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
1. The prevalence of statutes making sodomy illegal provides a barometer of public attitudes
toward homosexuals. While many statutes outlawing sodomy apply by their terms to sexual activities
engaged in by members of opposite sexes, and some prosecutions have been brought for such
conduct, the main target of sodomy statutes has always been homosexual activity. See generally Note,
The Crimes Against Nature, 16 L PUB. L 159 (1967). The legal boundaries of -sodomy" are
notoriously imprecise, and "the exact sexual activity proscribed will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and may include homosexual activity, oral-genital and anal-genital contacts between
members of the opposite sex, and sexual contacts with animals (bestiality)." Id at 159 n.l.
Until 1961, all of the states made it illegal to engage in sodomy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186,193-94 (1986). In 1961, Illinois decriminalized consensual sexual activities carried out by adults
in private, id at 193 n.7, and by 1986 twenty-five states had followed suit. Id at 193-94. Even so,
in 1986 twenty-four states continued to make sodomy illegal, even if performed in private by
consenting adults. In
There are some other indications that hostility toward homosexuals is somewhat less intense
than in the past. It appears that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence
Agency recently have softened their opposition to the employment of homosexuals. Rubenstein,
Challenging the Military'sAntilesbian andAntigay Policy, 1 LAw & SExuALrry 239,240 n.5 (1991).
Congress also recently repealed the prohibition on immigration by homosexuals. Id; Immigration Act
of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
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sexual activities that are available to them.' In addition, one
known to be a homosexual, or even suspected of that sexual
orientation, is likely to face discrimination in employment
(especially in the military, national defense, and law enforcement),
housing, education, and social acceptance.
Authoritative statistics on the proportion of the population that
is homosexual are difficult or impossible to obtain, since many gay
men and lesbians strive to conceal their sexual orientation as a way
of fending off discrimination.3 Even so, there has been an
2. Sodomy is a crime in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, Developments
in the Law- Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. RLv. 1508, 1519 & n.2 (1989), and that
term is broad enough to encompass the most intimate sexual activities in which homosexuals would
choose to engage. The vaginal intercourse considered "normal" for heterosexuals is not possible for
two individuals of the same sex who seek sexual intimacy with each other. In general, activities such
as kissing, touching, or masturbation, when engaged in by consenting adults of the same sex, are not
illegal. Butsee State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (upholding the propriety of a prosecution
of a male defendant under a statute proscribing "deviate sexual intercourse," where the defendant
had used his hand to touch the genitalia of a police officer through the officer's clothing); Watkins
v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988) ("the regulations barring homosexuals
from the Army cover any form of bodily contact between persons of the same sex that gives sexual
satisfaction - from oral and anal intercourse to holding hands, kissing, caressing and any number of
other sexual acts"). However, confining sexual expression to such activities would be severely
constraining for an individual of any sexual orientation.
This article does not attempt to address the issues raised by bisexuality or by heterosexual
activities engaged in by those whose primary sexual orientation is homosexual. To the extent that one
who is primarily heterosexual in orientation engages in sexual activity with a member of his or her
own sex, many of the legal barriers faced by homosexuals would probably be encountered. Here
again, the regulations barring homosexuals from the Army represent an exception to the usual pattern.
Although all those of homosexual orientation are excluded from reenlisting, those "who have been
involved in homosexual acts in an apparently isolated episode" due solely to immaturity, curiosity,
or intoxication will not normally be excluded from reenlistment unless there is other evidence that
the person is a homosexual. Id at 1336.
3. See Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science
Research, I LAw & SEXUALITY 133, 140 n.23 ("A common assumption today is that 10% of the
United States population is gay").
Estimates as to the number of lesbians and gay men differ depending on how those terms
are defined. Many people who have had same-sex sexual experiences do not label
themselves gay or lesbian, and others adopt the label without having had any same-sex
sexual experiences. Although equating sexual orientation with sexual activity is both
inaccurate and problematic, studies estimating the percentage of the population comprised
of gay men and lesbians depend on such definitions. A recent study indicates that 20.3%
of men have had at least one sexual encounter to orgasm with another man, and 6.7%
have had such an encounter after age 19 .... Older studies on women report a lower
frequency of same-sex sexual activity. ... The percentage of men and women who
acknowledge psychological arousal by members of their gender is much larger.
Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1511 n.l.
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increased willingness over the past ten or twenty years for at least
some homosexuals to identify themselves as such, and for both
homosexuals and heterosexuals to support a variety of public
policies designed to eliminate or reduce discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
To be sure, it is still possible to be told that homosexuality is
equally as wrong as slavery, because "[s]odomy is against nature,
since it treats men as if they were women." 4 But statements of
that sort are not as common as they used to be. Most Americans
probably support the right of homosexuals to participate in the
political, economic, and social life of the nation.5 Substantial
fissures appear, however, as soon as efforts are made to determine
what treatment is "just" or "equal" or "fair" for homosexuals.
At one extreme, traditionalists argue that the price which
homosexuals must pay to be treated "the same" as heterosexuals
is to act "the same" -- at a minimum, to eschew sexual intimacy
with members of the same sex, and perhaps even to somehow
suppress their desire for such intimacies.6 At the opposite end of
4. Jaffa, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 313 (Winter 1991) (reviewing MoR,
GAYS/JUSTICE A STUDY Op ET/mcs, Socmiy, AND LAw (1988)). See also i. at 315 ("someone who
cannot say that sodomy is unnatural cannot say that incest is unnatural"); id. at 317 ("no civilized
person should wish to see homosexuality accepted as an equally valid 'alternative lifestyle').
5. Polling data on the public's attitudes toward homosexuals paint no clear picture. Compare
San Francisco Chronicle, June 26, 1992, at Al (in a new Gallup poll, "three-quarters said they
thought that gays should have equal job opportunities, but 57% said they find homosexuality
unacceptable"); Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 19,1992, at C4 Cm a Gallup poll of Catholics,
-'78 percent said homosexual men and women should have equal access to jobs, up from 58 percent
in 1977"); and Chicago Tribune, April 30, 1991, at I (a nationwide poll found that 80 percent of
Americans favor equal rights for gays and lesbians in the workplace, up from 71 percent in a similar
Gallup poll taken two years before) with USA Today, June 2, 1992, at 1D (a 1988 Gallup poll
showed 56% believed homosexual relations between consenting adults should not be legal; the
percentage was down to 36% in 1989 and back up to 54% in 1991); San Francisco Chronicle,
October 9, 1991, at B3 ("Americans have grown less accepting of homosexuals"; 61% "believe the
tolerance of gay life in the 1960s and 1970s was a 'bad thing for our society'); and Horn, Goings-
On Behind Bedroom Doors, 110 U.S. News & W.R. 64 (June 10, 1991) (there is a "growing
intolerance of homosexuality"; 68% expressed disapproval of homosexual activity in 1960, while
75% do so now).
6. Government-sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals is often aimed at sexual
conduct rather than at sexual orientation or preference as such. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Supreme Court held that there is no fundamental right protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment which prevents a state from making it a crime for two
consenting adults of the same sex to engage in oral intercourse. 478 U.S. at 194-96. While Hardwick
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the scale, advocates for the homosexual community assert that true
equality for gay men and lesbians requires not only such basic
reforms as revision of criminal laws dealing with sexual activity
and assurances against overt discrimination in housing,
employment, and education, but also dramatic changes in myriad
other social institutions, including those dealing with marriage,
child custody, child-rearing, and adoption.7
The purpose of this Essay is to describe the framework within
which steps toward accommodating the claims of homosexuals will
be resolved. Plainly, any discussion of this bundle of issues must
devote substantial attention to whatever "floor" is established by
the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court's 1986 decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick' is obviously of great significance, though
a number of other Supreme Court cases are pertinent, as are the
lower-court decisions interpreting and applying Hardwick. In
addition, a complex web of state law, both statutory and decisional,
is implicated, since the states have substantial latitude in deciding
how homosexuals should be treated.
The immediate impetus for the preparation of this Essay was
the controversy generated in California in 1991 by the state
legislature's passage, and Governor Pete Wilson's veto, of
Assembly Bill 101. 9 AB 101 would have enhanced the protection
given homosexuals under state law against discrimination in
employment."0 The gist of the Governor's veto message was that
the protection given homosexuals with regard to employment is
does not authorize the prosecution of those who have not engaged in homosexual conduct, the armed
forces endeavor to exclude all those who are homosexual in their sexual orientation, whether or not
they have actually engaged in sexual activities with members of their own sex. See, e.g., Watkins v.
United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), opinions withdrawn and plaintiff's claim upheld
on another ground, 875 F.2d 699 (en banc 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 384 (1990); Steffan v.
Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
7. A number of these issues are surveyed in Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1603-
71.
8. 478 U.S. 186.
9. A. B. 101, 1991-92 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. [hereinafter AB 101].
10. In general, the bill amended a number of California statutes to add "sexual orientation"
to the list of personal characteristics which it is illegal for an employer to use as a basis for refusing
to hire a person or discriminating in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. See, e.g., § 7.2
of AB 101 (proposing an amendment to § 12940 of the Government Code).
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already adequate, or at least close enough to being adequate, to
militate against imposing additional costs on businesses which
would have to defend against potentially unmeritorious
discrimination claims."
For the reasons that will be given in greater detail below, the
proposition that homosexuals are already adequately shielded
against discrimination, whether in employment, housing, or in any
other sector worth noting, is indefensible. Wherever the proper end
point should be on the path from a past of egregious homophobia,
through the present to a future in which lesbians and gay men are
treated justly and welcomed as full members of our society, we are
nowhere near it yet.
This Essay will proceed as follows: First, it will describe
Hardwick and the significance of its holding that the right of
privacy protected by the federal constitution does not provide any
shield for those who engaged in homosexual acts which are
prohibited by statute. Second, an effort will be made to determine
whether the refusal by the Hardwick Court to recognize
constitutional privacy for homosexuals can reasonably be taken as
also exposing to prosecution heterosexuals who engage in oral or
anal sex. This inquiry is important because much of the impact of
Hardwick turns on whether it singles out homosexuals for disfavor,
or whether alternatively it would also provide a basis for upholding
strict limits on the nonmarital sexual activities of both homosexuals
and heterosexuals. Third, the consequences of Hardwick for the
status of homosexuals under equal protection law will be explored,
since it is at least theoretically possible that the protection which
homosexuals were denied in Hardwick when a claim was raised
under the privacy doctrine might be granted as an application of
equal protection law.
11. See Veto Message of Governor Pete Wilson Concerning Assembly Bill 101, September
29, 1991, at 4 ("The test of fairness to be applied to AB 101 is whether there is evidence of
discrimination so pervasive as to warrant state government imposing so widely a burden so
oppressive to potentially numerous innocent employers ... Fairness demands that where other
protections exist in the law, anecdotal evidence of even invidious discrimination - if it has not been
shown to be pervasive - does not warrant imposing that burden").
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The conclusions reached below on these questions are (1) that
Hardwick incorrectly interpreted and applied the Supreme Court's
prior privacy cases in rejecting Hardwick's claim for constitutional
protection; (2) that the Court's ruling almost certainly does not
limit the sexual freedom to engage in heterosexual activities; and
(3) that the approach taken by the Court in Hardwick leaves no
realistic basis for predicting that homosexuals will be found to be
protected by any heightened form of equal protection review. The
fourth section of this Essay looks to the future in light of these
conclusions. Given the Supreme Court's Hardwick decision and the
devastating consequences which that opinion has for efforts to
obtain federal constitutional protection for homosexual activity,
progress in guaranteeing equality for homosexuals will depend in
large measure on institutions other than the federal courts.
The immediate tragedy of the Hardwick decision was to give
the Supreme Court's imprimatur to discrimination against
homosexuals, a form of discrimination which remains both intense
and widespread. The harm done by the decision will be greater and
more long-lasting, however, if those supporting true equality of
treatment hold out false hopes for salvation from the federal
constitutional sphere. Certain forms of egregious discrimination
against homosexuals have been and will continue to be invalidated
under the rubric of rational basis equal protection review, but the
strong anti-homosexual message delivered by Hardwick severely
limits what can be done as a matter of federal constitutional law to
obtain redress. Substantial progress toward equality will depend for
the most part on the willingness of legislators, state judges, and
private individuals to do what Governor Wilson was not willing to
do -- to recognize both the continuing injustice inflicted on
homosexuals and the necessity for all available legislative,
litigative, and political approaches to be brought to bear. Only in
that way can the baneful influence of the Hardwick decision be
diluted and ultimately dissolved.
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I. HARDWICK AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Due to a series of extremely unlucky coincidences, a police
officer entered Michael Hardwick's bedroom in Atlanta in 1982
while Hardwick was engaged in oral sex with another man.12
Hardwick was arrested and charged with a violation of Georgia
Code section 16-6-2, which provides in part: "(a) A person
commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another." 13 State law made a violation of the
statute punishable by up to twenty years in prison.14 Apparently
Georgia had not made any effort in decades to enforce its sodomy
statute against those engaging in consensual homosexual activities
in private, and consistent with that policy the charge against
Hardwick was promptly dropped. 5 Hardwick then became the
vehicle for test-case litigation which had been planned for years,
but which had previously lacked an appropriate plaintiff. 6 The
12. Michael Hardwick has prepared a detailed first-person narrative of the events that led up
to the case which was heard and decided by the Supreme Court as Bowers v. Hardwick. P. IRONS,
THE CoURAGE OF THE CONvICTIONS 392-403 (1988). Hardwick had received a ticket for drinking
in public, and he missed his scheduled court appearance due to a discrepancy on the ticket as to what
day he was obligated to appear. Id. at 394. When Hardwick did not appear in court, the arresting
officer immediately processed a warrant for Hardwick's arrest and went to his house to arrest him.
Id. Hardwick was not there, but when he heard of the officer's visit he became aware that he should
have appeared in court a day earlier than he thought he was scheduled. Id. Hardwick immediately
went to court and paid the $50 fine he was assessed. Id. Apparently without realizing that the arrest
warrant was no longer valid due to Hardwick's court appearance and his payment of the fine, the
police officer who had arrested him on the original charge of drinking in public returned to his house
three weeks later. Id. at 395. The front door of Hardwick's house had been left open, and a friend
of Hardwick's was on a couch in the living room, sleeping off a drinking binge. Id. When awakened
by the officer, Hardwick's friend did not even know that Hardwick was home, but allowed the officer
to go looking for him. Id. The officer found Hardwick in his bedroom engaged in "mutual oral sex"
with another man. Id.
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988).
14. 1&
15. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986) ("After a preliminary hearing, the
District Attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence
developed").
16. Perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, Hardwick reports that after being released from jail
following his arrest, he was contacted "by a man named Clint Sumrall who was working in and out
of the ACLU. For the last five years, he would go to the courts every day and find sodomy cases and
try to get a test case." IRoNs, supra note 12, at 396.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in
favor of the plaintiff's claim that his sexual activities were
protected by the privacy principles developed by the Supreme
Court in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut7 and Eisenstadt
v. Baird,8 involving access to contraception, and Roe v. Wade,19
the 1973 abortion ruling.2"
In Hardwick, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit
and rejected the plaintiff's privacy claim by a vote of 5-4.21 The
majority acknowledged that "the cases are legion" in which the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments "have
been interpreted to have substantive content," but it declared that
'inone of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy."'  The Hardwick Court held that the
reach of substantive due process is limited to fundamental liberties
which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 23 or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, ' 14 and that
it is "obvious" that the right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy is not properly included within either
category.25
The Court discussed at some length the fact that proscriptions
against homosexual sodomy have "ancient roots, ' ' 2 and it
refused to recognize any constitutional protection for such conduct
because the "Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution." 27 Having thus rejected the sole theory upon which
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. 760 F.2d 1202 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
21. 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986).
22. Id at 190-91.
23. Id at 191, (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
24. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion of Powell, J.)).
25. Id at 192.
26. Id at 192-94.
27. Id at 194.
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the plaintiff based his claim for heightened constitutional
scrutiny,' the Court looked only to whether there was a rational
basis for the sodomy law.29 The Court found a constitutionally
adequate justification in "the presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable," since "if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
courts will be very busy indeed." 3 The Court noted that twenty-
four states and the District of Columbia had statutes similar to the
Georgia statute.3
As argued vigorously by the four dissenters in Hardwick and as
has been recognized by many commentators, the analysis of the
privacy doctrine offered up by Justice White gives an indefensibly
narrow and wooden reading to the pre-Hardwick precedents.
32
Justice White carefully listed the precise facts of each prior case --
for example, that Griswold and Eisenstadt dealt with access to
contraception, and that Roe v. Wade addressed a woman's right to
choose to have an abortion -- and concluded that none of the prior
cases established a "constitutional right of homosexuals to engage
in acts of sodomy." 33 The Court's statement is indisputable, since
none of the prior cases involved any claim by homosexuals of a
constitutional right to do anything. However, in choosing to
characterize the dispute in Hardwick in this way, Justice White
extracts and discards the essence of the earlier cases. 4
28. The Court noted that plaintiff Hardwick did not defend the Eleventh Circuit's judgment
on the basis of the ninth amendment, the equal protection clause, or the eighth amendment. Id. at 196
n.8.
29. Id. at 196.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Id. at 199-214 (Blaclunun, J., dissenting); id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1523 n.30 ("Commentators have been virtually unanimous
in their criticism of Hardwick's reading of the Court's privacy jurisprudence"); Vieira, Hardwick and
the Right of Privacy, 55 U. Cm-. L RaY. 1181, 1181 (1988) ("Hardwick is fundamentally at odds
with the philosophy that prevailed in earlier cases involving the right of privacy").
33. 478 U.S. at 190-91.
34. "The essential 'liberty' that animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Carey [v. Population Services Internationa4 431 U.S. 678 (1977)] surely embraces
the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or
immoral." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1551
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The fatal flaw in Justice White's opinion for the Court in
Hardwick is that it reduces constitutional analysis of an asserted
substantive due process or privacy claim to a simple matter of
checking the "list" of prior circumstances in which such claims
have been accepted. If there is no prior recognition of the precise
protection sought by the claimant, the claim is rejected, unless the
claimant can add a new item to the "list" by showing that it is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'35 or "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."
'3 6
The basic issues upon which Hardwick is properly seen to turn,
but with which the majority never confronted, are the interrelated
questions of the level of generality with which the prior cases
should be characterized, and the significance which should be given
to the fact that the activity for which Hardwick sought protection
had been a crime for many years and remained a crime in half the
states. It is true that Griswold presented the question of whether
Connecticut could constitutionally prohibit all use of contraceptives
by married couples.37 However, if that is all that was decided by
the case, then it is difficult to have confidence that the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Eisenstadt was correct, since that
case involved the access of unmarried persons to birth control.38
While the Eisenstadt Court concluded that the Massachusetts
statute in dispute was unconstitutional in prescribing "dissimilar
treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly
situated," 39 the approach taken in Hardwick would have
counseled the opposite result, based on the simple observation that
the unmarried couples whose rights were at stake in Eisenstadt
were not and could not be similarly situated to the married couples
whose rights were discussed in Griswold. Justice Douglas's opinion
for the Court in Griswold is focused entirely on the institution of
marriage and its unique status in our society, with nary a word
35. Id at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
36. 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion of Powell, J.)).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
39. Id at 454.
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about the similar intimacies and mutual support that may be
enjoyed by an unmarried couple.'
To take another example, the narrow reading of precedents
called for by Hardwick, which limits each case to the precise
matters presented for decision, would strip the Court's abortion
opinion in Roe v. Wade of any support to be derived from the
Court's prior decisions. Justice Blackmun, in Roe, discussed the
earlier decisions and concluded that the right of privacy they
implicated "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." '41 His conclusion may
or may not be correct, but it is indisputable that no case prior to
Roe had recognized a woman's constitutionally-protected right to
choose to have an abortion.
The core issue upon which Hardwick turned -- which might be
isolated by asking: "Are Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe merely
about contraception and abortion, or do they limit the government's
ability to interfere with our intimate sexual relationships and
reproductive processes, absent a very strong justification?" -- was
addressed by Justices Scalia and Brennan three years later in
Michael H. v. Gerald D.42 Michael H. involved a claim to
parental rights by the apparent biological father (Michael) of a girl
who was born while the mother was married to another man. The
mother was cohabiting with her husband when the child was
conceived and born."s Under these circumstances, the governing
California law established a conclusive presumption that the
husband was the father of the child." Michael asserted that
substantive due process principles gave him a protected liberty
interest in continuing his relationship with his biological
40. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred").
41. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
42. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
43. Id at 115.
44. Id. The statute would not have applied if the husband were sterile or impotent, but he was
not. And, while it is possible to apply for blood tests to challenge the statutory presumption of
paternity by the husband, no such challenge was filed during the time permitted by the statute. Id.
1553
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daughter.45 Just as Hardwick turned on the boundaries of the
constitutional protection available for intimate sexual relations, so
Michael H. turned on the scope of the protection recognized for the
relationship between a father and a child who has been born to a
woman married to another. The Supreme Court rejected the claim
of the alleged natural father, holding that it "is a question of
legislative policy and not constitutional law whether California will
allow the presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain a
child conceived within and born into their marriage to be
rebutted." 46
Justice Scalia wrote as follows in footnote six of his opinion:
Justice Brennan criticizes our methodology in using historical traditions
specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous natural father, rather
than inquiring more generally "whether parenthood is an interest that
historically has received our attention and protection.".... We do not
understand why, having rejected our focus upon the societal tradition
regarding the natural father's rights vis-6-vis a child whose mother is
married to another man, Justice Brennan would choose to focus instead
upon "parenthood." Why should the relevant category not be even
more general -- perhaps "family relationships;" or "personal
relationships;" or even "emotional attachments in general?" Though
the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we
do: We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified.47
Plainly, Justice Scalia accepts the approach to constitutional
interpretation taken in Hardwick, and, for the reasons discussed
above, his reliance in Michael H. on Hardwick to support his
analysis is appropriate. The critical error was made in Hardwick
itself.48 Justice Brennan was plainly correct in Michael H. when
45. The mother and her husband had reconciled, and were living together with the girl and
two other children born into the marriage. Id.
46. X, at 129-30.
47. 14 at 127 n.6.
48. The introduction to Justice Scalia's opinion indicates that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined "in all but note 6" of the opinion. Id at 113. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the entire
opinion.
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he stated that, had the Court in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and other
cases "asked... itself whether the specific interest under
consideration had been traditionally protected, the answer would
have been a resounding 'no."' 49
Likewise, if substantive due process had only been applied by
the Court where most or all states had historically recognized the
right in question, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe would all appear
to be on shaky ground, perhaps even more so than the right
claimed in Hardwick. It is hard to imagine that the Court in
Griswold could have found a sufficiently specific and broadly-
accepted recognition of a married couple's right to have access to
birth control devices. By no stretch of the imagination could such
a tradition of protection have been found as to unmarried couples
seeking access to birth control, especially given the statutes in
many states making fornication itself a crime. Nor could Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Roe have withstood the inquiry called for
by Hardwick, despite Justice Blackmun's efforts to undercut the
significance of the sweeping restrictions on abortion by stating that
they were "of relatively recent vintage" since they were adopted
for the most part "in the latter half of the 19th century." 50" Not
only did Roe sweep aside criminal prohibitions that had been in
effect, even by Justice Blackmun's account, for nearly a century,
but the decision established a right to choose to have an abortion
which was broader than that recognized by any state at the time the
Supreme Court rendered its decision.51 Hardwick itself recognized
that fully half of the states had decriminalized the homosexual
conduct at issue. Thus, to the extent that general acceptance of an
activity among the states as being protected is a prerequisite to the
successful invocation of the constitutional privacy doctrine, it is
49. 1& at 139-40.
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
51. M. A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 48-49 (1987) (although
abortion laws in the United States were "in ferment" in 1973, only a few states had repealed their
criminal penalties for abortions performed in early pregnancy, and most states "had not yet revised
their criminal laws, which typically permitted abortion only to save the life of the mother"). Roe
prohibited states from regulating abortions prior to the time of viability (near the end of the second
trimester of pregnancy), except for regulation after the beginning of the second trimester in order to
assure the safety of the medical procedures being used. 410 U.S. at 162-64.
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clear that a much stronger case could be made for the protected
status of homosexual conduct in 1986 than could have been made
for abortion in 1973 when Roe was decided.
Hardwick brought about a severe break in the line of
development represented by the Supreme Court's earlier decisions
in such cases as Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe. The narrow reading
given to the earlier cases in Hardwick led Justice White to ask no
more than whether the Georgia statute was rational, and to
conclude that the asserted judgment of the people of Georgia that
"homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" provided a
rational foundation for the criminal provision at issue.52 There is
nothing in Justice White's opinion for the Court that suggests, nor
are there are other pertinent authorities which establish, that the
asserted moral judgment of the state's electorate provides a
sufficient justification for upholding a statute that is subject to
heightened scrutiny, whether of the strict or the intermediate
variety.
53
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has rendered a judgment on the correctness of
the Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick which is fully justified:
I believe that the Supreme Court egregiously misinterpreted the
Constitution in Hardwick. In my view, Hardwick improperly condones
official bias and prejudice against homosexuals, and authorizes the
criminalization of conduct that is an essential part of the intimate sexual
life of our many homosexual citizens, a group that has historically been
the victim of unfair and irrational treatment. I believe that history will
view Hardwick much as it views Plessy v. Ferguson .... And I am
confident that, in the long run, Hardwick, like Plessy, will be overruled
by a wiser and more enlightened Court.5
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
53. Roe is instructive on this point, since in that case the Supreme Court upheld a very broad
right of women to choose to have an abortion, even though the opposing interest of the state in
protecting the potential life of the fetus is surely a weighty one.
54. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,1358 (1988) (dissenting opinion), opinions
withdrawn and plaintif's claim upheld on another ground, 875 F.2d 699 (en bane 1989), cer.
denied, II1 S. Ct. 384 (1990). The panel opinion, from which Judge Reinhardt dissented, held that
the Army regulations excluding all homosexuals from the service violated equal protection. 847 F.2d
at 1339-53. On rehearing en bane, the Ninth Circuit held that the Army was estopped, under the
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II. HARDWICK AND HETEROSEXUALS
The discussion so far has proceeded as if the Georgia statute
involved in Hardwick prohibited "homosexual sodomy." Most of
the Court's discussion is framed using that term, and there is
certainly nothing in Justice White's opinion for the Court which in
any way establishes that Georgia could constitutionally make it a
crime for a heterosexual couple to commit sodomy. However, the
Georgia statute itself made no distinction among the various classes
of individuals who might engage in the activities prohibited by the
statute; the law did not even exempt married couples from its
reach.5 Thus, under the terms of the statute, a "person" commits
the offense of sodomy "when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another," whether or not the two participants are of the same
sex, and even if they are a man and a woman who are married to
one another.56 The "he" referred to in the statute, which was
drafted before linguistic sensibilities became as refined as they are
now, plainly means "he or she."
' 57
Obviously the Georgia statute would be unconstitutional, at
least in part, if enforced literally against all persons, including
married couples. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the
attorney representing the state conceded that the statute could not
constitutionally be enforced against married couples in light of
Griswold.-8 More intriguing, but less directly addressed at the
circumstances presented, from relying on Watkins' homosexuality as a basis for denying him
reenlistment. 875 F.2d at 705-11.
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988).
56. 1&
57. An earlier version of the Georgia statute had been interpreted by the Georgia Supreme
Court not to apply to lesbian activity. Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467,200 S.E. 799 (1939). The
statute at issue in Hardwick, which was adopted in 1968, substantially broadened the definition of
sodomy to include cunnilingus by females, overturning Thompson v. Aldredge. See Note, supra note
1, at 167 n.47.
58. At oral argument, Michael E. Hobbs, the Assistant Attorney General representing
petitioner Michael J. Bowers, was asked: "Do you think it would be constitutional or unconstitutional
to apply it to a married couple?" Hobbs responded: "I believe it would be unconstitutional." 164
LANDMARK BREFs AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 633, 636
(transcript of oral argument of Bowers v. Hardwick, held on March 31, 1986).
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argument,. was the question of whether Georgia could
constitutionally enforce the statute against an unmarried
heterosexual couple.59 So far as appears, there was no history of
enforcement against heterosexual sodomy, but then again there had
not been a reported case involving private homosexual sodomy
since 1939.60
At least on the surface of the Court's opinion in Hardwick, the
possibility exists that the Court's decision upholding the statute is
based on the unstated assumption that the statute will be applied
evenhandedly to homosexuals and heterosexuals alike. The Court
does note in footnote eight of its opinion that it had no need to
address any equal protection argument, since respondent Hardwick
did not present one.61 However, in light of the opinion as a whole,
it is unlikely that the Court's decision upholding the Georgia
statute in any way depends on the assumption that Georgia will
prosecute both heterosexuals and homosexuals for the acts
proscribed by the statute. Thus, in footnote two the Court stated:
"The only claim properly before the Court . . . is Hardwick's
challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual
homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on the
constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of
sodomy." 62
In addition, the Court's discussion is laced with references to
"homosexual sodomy" as the evil against which the state was
acting.63 There is no discussion whatsoever of the constitutional
59. Assistant Attorney General Hobbs stated that "'there is no precedential support in the
decisions of this Court for the proposition that there is a fundamental right to engage in sexual
relationships outside of the bonds of marriage." Id. at 635. The Court did not question Hobbs about
whether the State took the position that it could constitutionally apply the statute to unmarried
heterosexuals.
60. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). See 164 LANDMARK
BRmIs AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 633, 634 (transcript of
oral argument in Bowers v. Hardwick, held on March 31, 1986).
61. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8.
62. Id. at 188 n.2.
63. See, e.g., id. at 191 ("claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy"); id. at 192 ("neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy"); 1&. at 196 ("the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable").
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status of sodomy practiced by heterosexuals. Despite the all-
inclusive language of the statute, Georgia never directly asserted
any interest in enforcing it against anyone other than homosexuals
and the Supreme Court never suggested that enforcing the statute
against homosexual activity, yet not against sodomy practiced by
heterosexuals, would raise any constitutional difficulty.'
At this point it is appropriate to raise a linguistic quibble about
the "homosexual sodomy" language utilized by Justice White for
the Hardwick majority. There is no denying that "sodomy" sounds
like a highly antisocial activity. The dictionary definition bears out
that instinct: sodomy is "any sexual intercourse held to be
abnormal, esp. bestiality or anal intercourse between two male
persons. "' In reality, however, several of the practices prohibited
by the Georgia statute are in no sense "abnormal" or "unnatural"
or even unusual among heterosexual couples.
The American Psychological Association and the American
Public Health Association filed an amicus curiae brief in Hardwick,
and in it they surveyed the literature describing the sexual practices
which are prevalent in the United States. According to the brief, a
"major study of couples in the United States published in 1983
found that 90% of the married and unmarried heterosexual couples
studied had engaged in fellatio and that 93 % of these couples had
engaged in cunnilingus. Other recent surveys similarly report that
80-90% of all married couples engage in oral sex."" Thus,
contrary to the suggestion of perversity created by the Hardwick
Court's repeated references to "homosexual sodomy," the
categories of "sodomy" prohibited by the statute are so broad that
most Americans routinely engage in at least some of them.67
64. See iL at 200 (Blackmun, L, dissenting) ("Unlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has
not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives
may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other
citizens"). The Hardwck litigation originally included a heterosexual couple as plaintiffs, but they
were held to lack standing because of the history of nonenforcement of the statute against
heterosexuals. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 1985).
65. WnsTam's NEw WoRLD DIcnoNARY Op AMEcAN ENGUSH 1274 (3d Coll. Ed. 1988).
66. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American Public Health
Association at 5-6, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
67. Developments In the Law, supra note 2, at 1569 n.98.
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The recognition that the Georgia statute on its face prohibits
heterosexual activities which are so commonly practiced, albeit
rarely prosecuted, suggests that it is worthwhile to address the
question of what would happen if Georgia or some other state
attempted to prosecute an unmarried, heterosexual couple who had
engaged in oral or anal sex in private." After Eisenstadt, which
prescribed equal treatment for the married and the unmarried at
least with respect to access to contraceptives, it is not surprising
that these cases are almost never prosecuted. Moreover, in the rare
instances where they are pursued by prosecutors, the real reason for
the prosecution is usually an allegation that the sexual activity was
coerced. For example, in Schochet v. State the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland held that a charge for consensual
fellatio could be sustained because Eisenstadt involved the "right
to use contraception to avoid unwanted pregnancy," not "a right
to engage in unmarried sodomy." 7" However, the male defendant
in Schochet was not really being prosecuted for consensual oral
sex. The consensual sodomy charge tagged along after six charges
of rape and coerced oral and anal intercourse, and remained after
defendant was acquitted of all of the charges involving allegations
of force.7 The jury convicted the defendant only on the
consensual sodomy charge.72 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland overturned the conviction, but avoided the constitutional
question."3 Instead of undertaking the analysis required to assess
the constitutional protection, if any, available after Hardwick for
consensual sodomy practiced by an unmarried heterosexual couple,
the Schochet court interpreted Maryland's statute "to exclude
consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in
private."' The court's purported statutory interpretation is
68. Although anal intercourse is less common than oral sex among heterosexual couples, Brief
of Arnici Curiae, supra note 66, at 6, there is no reason to believe that the constitutional analysis
would be any different than that advanced in the text with respect to oral sex.
69. 75 Md. App. 314,541 A.2d 183 (1988).
70. Id at 192.
71. Id at 184.
72. Id
73. 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990).
74. Id at 184, 186.
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remarkable in light of the wording of the statute, which prescribes
a prison term of up to ten years for every person "who shall be
convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth of any
other person."
75
With the reversal of the conviction in Schochet, post-Hardwick
judicial acceptance of prosecution of consensual heterosexual oral
intercourse in private has been limited to the United States Court
of Military Appeals.76 Barring future constitutional developments
which appear unlikely,' Hardwick will not lead to the successful
prosecution of adults who engage in consensual oral sex with a
member of the opposite sex.78 Thus, despite the sweeping terms
in which the Georgia sodomy statute involved in Hardwick was
written, and the failure of the statute to distinguish in any way
between homosexual and heterosexual acts, Hardwick is about
homosexuals, not about sodomy.
79
75. MD. CODE ANN, CRIMES & PUNISH. § 554 (1992).
76. The Court of Military Appeals recently affirmed the conviction of a male soldier who
engaged in fellatio with a woman in violation of Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Article 125 prohibits "unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex,"
and the Court of Military Appeals relied principally on Hardwick in upholding its constitutionality.
United States v. Henderson, 34 MJ. 174 (1992). Accord, United States v. Fagg, 34 MJ. 179 (C.M.A.
1992), rev'g 33 MJ. 618 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991).
77. Prosecutions of heterosexuals for consensual, private oral or anal sex are so rare that there
are few occasions for the courts even to consider extending the logic of Hardiwick to such cases. If
and when such cases are litigated, it appears overwhelmingly likely, for the reasons discussed in the
text, that Hardiwick will be interpreted in the spirit in which it was written, as a holding aimed at
homosexual activity rather than at oral or anal sex as such. As indicated in the text and in note 76
supra, the United States Court of Military Appeals has concluded, contrary to the argument advanced
here, that Hardwick does authorize the prosecution of consensual heterosexual oral intercourse carried
out in private.
78. An exhaustive analysis of statutes forbidding fornication and adultery concludes that, even
after Hardwick such activities enjoy substantial constitutional protection. Note, Constitutional
Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660
(1991).
79. "The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court's willingness to condone anti-
homosexual animus in the actions of the government, are clear." Watkins v. United States Army, 847
F.2d 1329, 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, L, dissenting), opinions withdrawn andplaintiff's claim
upheld on another ground, 875 F.2d 699 (en banc 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
1561
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 23
IH. HARDWICK AND EQUAL PROTECTION
While Hardwick authorizes Georgia to prosecute homosexuals
for oral sex while declining to enforce the statute against
heterosexuals for the same activity, the Court's failure to address
equal protection at all in its opinion has generated substantial
uncertainty about how courts should deal with post-Hardwick cases
in which homosexuals raise equal protection claims outside of the
specific context in which Hardwick arose. Prior to Hardwick, many
commentators argued that the equal protection doctrines developed
by the Supreme Court called for heightened scrutiny of
classifications disadvantaging homosexuals."0 While the precise
criteria by which groups are determined to be entitled to heightened
scrutiny are a bit muddy, it appears that, if Hardwick had never
been decided, homosexuals would almost certainly be entitled to at
least intermediate scrutiny of classifications based on sexual
preference, and perhaps to strict scrutiny.
First, homosexuals have undoubtedly been subjected to
discrimination as a historical matter."' Second, they "exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define
them as a discrete group."8 " While homosexual orientation may
not be "obvious," it certainly is "distinguishing," and it is
"immutable," as a practical matter.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
disputed this point, stating: "Homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different
from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already
existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes."8" The Ninth Circuit's
80. See, e.g., Note, An Argumentfor the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Clossfications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAI. L Rev. 797 (1984); Note, The Constitutional
Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285
(1985).
81. This factor is recognized as significantby the Supreme Court in numerous cases. See, e.g.,
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
82. Id.
83. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (1990),
rehearing denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990). Accord, Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.
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casual assertion that individuals are free to choose, as adults,
whether they will be attracted to and seek sexual intimacy with
members of the opposite sex or those of their own sex is contrary
to what both common sense and the available scientific evidence
tell us." It matters little for present purposes how much of our
sexual preference is biologically determined, and how much is
attributable to the environments in which we are reared. What is
significant is that by the time we reach sexual maturity and begin
forming intimate sexual relationships with others, we have little
ability to choose whether those to whom we will be attracted are
of the same or the opposite sex.85 Can it seriously be suggested,
given the harsh discrimination which homosexuals face, that such
a sizable segment of society would freely choose to labor under
this disadvantage if a simple change of mind would grant access to
the majority group and end the discrimination?
8 6
A final factor bearing on the appropriateness, under traditional
equal protection analysis, of granting homosexuals as a class the
protection of heightened judicial scrutiny, is their political
influence. Several courts have found heightened scrutiny
1991).
84. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research,
I LAW & SEXUALUTY 133, 152 (1991) (surveying the literature and concluding that "the assertion
that homosexuality is a choice that can be changed is erroneous for the vast majority of lesbians and
gay men").
85. Id,; Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1547 (D. Kan. 1991) (quoting High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377 (1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en bane): "Sexual orientation becomes fixed during early childhood, 'it is not a matter
of conscious or controllable choice." Herek's article and the cited opinions rely on numerous
scientific studies supporting the conclusion that adults cannot simply choose their sexual orientation.
Herek, supra note 84, at 152; Jantz, 759 F.Supp. at 1547. The decisions cited in note 83 supra do
not identify any support for their contrary assertion that homosexuality is a matter on which an
individual may simply change his or her mind, and thereby avoid the adverse consequences which
flow from being a homosexual in a society that discriminates against them.
86. In any event, the Supreme Court has never required absolute "immutability" of a
characteristic for it to qualify as a basis for application of heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification based on alienage even though
most resident aliens are eligible to become citizens after five years). See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DisTRusT 150-55 (1980). It is possible to change one's sex surgically in some cases, but that
does not keep gender classifications from being subjected to intermediate scrutiny. Similarly,
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation, if shown to be appropriate in other
respects, would not become inapplicable upon a showing that some homosexuals could redirect their
sexual preference if they desired to do so.
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unavailable for homosexuals because "homosexuals are proving
that they are not without growing political power" and therefore
have the ability to attract favorable attention from legislators.8 7
Whatever level of political exclusion must be shown in order
to qualify for heightened scrutiny under established equal
protection doctrine, it is a cruel hoax to suggest that homosexuals
are so powerful that they do not need the additional protection
against discrimination which heightened scrutiny affords. The long
history of discrimination against homosexuals is not disputed. In
fact, Hardwick revels in the "ancient roots" of the law's harsh
treatment of homosexuals who engage in sexual intimacies."8
While some states and cities have passed statutes protecting the
rights of homosexuals in certain matters, a few isolated instances
of political success cannot disqualify a group from being a
beneficiary of heightened scrutiny. After all, blacks, the
quintessential group benefitting from the use of strict scrutiny
under the Supreme Court's equal protection cases, are protected by
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, as well as a
multitude of federal, state, and local enactments protecting their
civil rights and forbidding discrimination on the basis of race. 9
Women are the direct beneficiaries of the nineteenth amendment
and are also protected by an array of statutes that specifically ban
discrimination based on gender and prescribe remedies if such
discrimination occurs." It is entirely fanciful to suggest that
homosexuals as a group have anything akin to the political power
exercised by blacks or women, and therefore it is wrong to deny
them heightened equal protection scrutiny on the basis of whatever
power they do hold. As is the case for blacks and women,
homosexuals do not wield the political power to which their
numbers entitle them, justifying stricter judicial scrutiny of
87. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,466 (7th Cir. 1989); High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at
574; Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 7-9.
88. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192(1986). Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion
seems to look back with nostalgia on the days when homosexual activity was a capital crime under
Roman law. See id at 196.
89. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
90. See, e.g., id
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classifications which disadvantage them. Moreover, whatever level
of political power could theoretically be exercised by homosexuals,
given their numbers, is severely undercut by the fact that well-
justified fears of discrimination lead many homosexuals to conceal
their status and therefore to limit the effectiveness of their efforts
to obtain protection through the political process.91
But for Hardwick, the discussion presented above would lead
to the conclusion that classifications based on sexual orientation
trigger heightened scrutiny under established equal protection
doctrine. However, despite the overwhelming case that can be made
for considering homosexuals to be entitled to the application of at
least intermediate equal protection scrutiny, it is difficult to see
how one can reach that conclusion while Hardwick is the law.
Professor Cass Sunstein has made an extremely forceful and
creative effort to divorce the substantive due process holding of
Hardwick from equal protection issues that will come up in the
future, but that effort seems to me to be ultimately unsuccessful.'
Professor Sunstein focused his discussion on Hardwick and on the
Watkins litigation in the Ninth Circuit,93 in which a soldier raised
an equal protection challenge to the Army's categorical exclusion
of all those whose sexual preference is homosexual, without regard
to any proof of homosexual acts.94 Professor Sunstein not only
contended that Hardwick left open the possibility that heightened
scrutiny is appropriate for classifications based on homosexuality,
but he went so far as to assert that Hardwick has "no bearing" on
91. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543,1550 (D. Kan. 1991). See ELY, supra note 86, at 162-
64. An individual's homosexuality may be such a closely-guarded secret that public revelation of it
by others may cause great harm. See Grant, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual
Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Court's CategoricalJurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 103
(1991).
92. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L REV. 1161 (1988).
93. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), opinions withdrawn and
plaintiff's claim upheld on another ground, 875 F.2d 699 (en banc 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
384 (1990).
94. A panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld Watkins' equal protection claim. The panel decision
was later vacated and all resolution of the constitutional issue was avoided when Watkins was granted
the relief he sought on the ground of estoppel, since he had informed the Army of his homosexuality
upon induction and on later occasions.
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the equal protection issue." The essence of Professor Sunstein's
argument is as follows:
[A] large part of the function of the [Due Process Clause] has been to
limit myopic or short-term deviations from social convictions that have
been long and widely held.... Since its inception, the Equal Protection
Clause has served an entirely different set of purposes from the Due
Process Clause. The Equal Protection Clause is emphatically not an
effort to protect traditionally held values against novel or short-term
deviations.... The function of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect
disadvantaged groups, of which blacks are the most obvious case,
against the effects of past and present discrimination by political
majorities.... The clause does not safeguard traditions; it protects
against traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted.
96
Professor Sunstein's conclusion is that, even after Hardwick, courts
are free to, and should as a matter of correctly applying equal
protection law, subject statutes based on sexual orientation to
heightened scrutiny.'
The distinction which Professor Sunstein would have us make
between the substantive due process and equal protection
guarantees seems to have some merit in general, though like
everyone else he had trouble fitting the Supreme Court's privacy
decisions into a coherent pattern which is consistent with his
theory. But whatever may be the merit of Professor Sunstein's
observations as applied to other problems, they are of very little
relevance to the particular problem to which his article is
addressed. While it may be perfectly possible for the Supreme
Court to reject a substantive due process claim without fatally
injuring or even wounding a closely-related equal protection claim,
separation of the two theories is simply not possible in the area of
95. Sunsteinsupra note 92, at 1170; see also id. at 1166 n.26 (Hardwick has "no relevance"
to equal protection); id at 1168 (Hardwick "simply does not bear" on the equal protection challenge
raised in Watkins).
96. Id. at 1174.
97. Professor Sunstein makes much of the distinction between homosexual acts such as those
at issue in Hardwick, and homosexual orientation itself, which was the sole basis upon which the
Army attempted to discharge Watkins. Id. at 1166 n.26. However, he also states that even those
classifications based on homosexual acts should be evaluated under heightened scrutiny. Id.
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homosexual rights after Hardwick. The insuperable difficulty with
which equal protection plaintiffs seeking heightened scrutiny must
contend is not what the Supreme Court decided in Hardwick. The
problem, instead, is how the Supreme Court got to its conclusion.
The aspect of Hardwick which demolishes a claim for
heightened equal protection review for classifications based on
sexual orientation is the particular "rational basis" found for the
Georgia statute. The Supreme Court held that the statute was a
rational one apparently based on "the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable." '98 This approach boils down to
"discrimination for its own sake," which the Supreme Court has
rejected in other equal protection contexts." Especially in light of
the fact that the Georgia statute itself made no distinction between
homosexuals and heterosexuals, there is no way to make sense out
of Hardwick except as a holding that societal hostility toward
homosexuals is justified, or at least that a rational legislature could
conclude that it is justified. The theory upon which blacks, aliens,
women, and illegitimate children are granted the benefits of
heightened equal protection scrutiny is that they are likely to be
disadvantaged by society for reasons having little or nothing to do
with their worth."° The inescapable message of Hardwick, with
which I disagree but which I see no way to dodge, is that
discrimination against homosexuals is based on an appropriate
societal revulsion for their activities.1°1
The anti-homosexual core of Hardwick becomes especially
apparent if one considers the practical impact of the Court's
98. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
99. See, e.g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (-If
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a kgidmate governmental interest") (emphasis in original).
100. ELY, supra note 86, at 145-70.
101. Professor Ely uses the example of burglars as a group toward which there is widespread
societal hostility, but hostility which in no way renders improper the laws which disadvantage
burglars. ELY, supra note 86, at 154. For the Hardwick Court, homosexuals are the equivalent of
burglars, since the conduct in which they engage justifies the sanctions which society imposes on
them.
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readiness to condemn "homosexual sodomy" while apparently
accepting the fact that the state has no intention of enforcing the
statute in its literal application to oral and anal sex practiced by
heterosexual couples. Heterosexual couples, who have the option
of enjoying sexual intimacy in the form of vaginal intercourse, are
free in addition to choose to engage in oral and anal sex without
fearing prosecution. Homosexuals, on the other hand, who do not
have the option of engaging in vaginal intercourse within their
homosexual relationships, are subject to at least a theoretical risk
of prosecution if they take advantage of the only types of sexual
intercourse which are available to them.
One possible way in which Hardwick can be found to be less
sweeping in effect than suggested above is to emphasize, as
Professor Sunstein did, that Michael Hardwick admitted to
homosexual acts, whereas some homosexuals -- most obviously
Watkins and any other homosexual desiring to serve in the armed
forces -- are disadvantaged purely on the basis of their sexual
orientation. At least with regard to determining the appropriate
level of judicial review, this seems to be a false distinction. Given
the centrality of sexual relationships and sexual intimacy to our
lives, it is meaningless to say that the group is entitled to special
protection under the equal protection clause so long as members of
the group refrain from all sexual activities which are considered
immoral by the majority of the electorate. For homosexuals,
sodomy is not like jaywalking or stamp collecting, an incidental
activity in which an individual may choose to engage or instead
choose to refrain from. The only way that the distinction between
orientation and acts can help Watkins, or those like him, is on the
assumption that homosexuals will join the service and then remain
celibate throughout their careers. While it is possible that a few
individuals might choose such a course, they would certainly not
be large enough in number to justify analyzing the rights of
homosexuals as if celibacy were typical or even common. Perhaps
worse, if the armed forces were forced through such a strained
equal protection analysis to accept homosexuals who claimed to
refrain from all sexual activity, the inevitable consequence would
be extensive government snooping into the private sex lives of
1568
1992 / Moving Toward Equal Treatment of Homosexuals
soldiers -- precisely the sort of invasion at which the Griswold
decision was principally aimed.
The bottom line is that the decision in Hardwick did more than
misapply the substantive due process precedents. Hardwick also
derailed the equal protection analysis which, properly applied in the
absence of the Hardwick holding, would have led to the application
of heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation.
IV. POST-HARDWICK LIMrrS ON DISCRMINATION
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS
If the "rational basis" scrutiny utilized in Hardwick is the only
tool which constitutional law makes available to those challenging
classifications based on sexual orientation, are almost all challenges
to discrimination against homosexuals doomed to fail? I do not
believe that they are, and in fact they have not been uniformly
unsuccessful. In the context of a criminal statute like that involved
in Hardwick, "rational basis review" has no teeth at all. As the
Court itself indicates, our laws are "constantly based on notions of
morality,"'" and those choices by their very nature are not
readily susceptible to judicial second-guessing. This is especially
true when the statute at issue is not actively enforced by the
government, so that a court might take the view that the moral
pronouncement made by the statute is the only effect of that statute.
Perhaps Hardwick can be viewed as the Court's statement that if
the Georgia legislature wants to pass a statute which declares, in
effect, that homosexuality is immoral, and the state is willing to
leave the matter at that, then the Court has no proper role in
trumping the legislature with a counterdeclaration that
homosexuality is entitled to equal treatment. 3
102. 478 U.S. at 196.
103. Viewed in this way, Hardwick would be very similar to the Supreme Courts refusal in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1989), to adjudicate the
constitutionality of the preamble to Missouri's statute regulating abortions, which declared that human
life begins at conception. The Court held that no Article Ill case or controversy was presented by the
challenge raised to the preamble, since the preamble could be read simply to express a value
judgment (favoring childbirth over abortion) which the state was entitled to make. The preamble had
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Rational basis review has much more force when classifications
are actually being used to disadvantage individuals on the basis of
their sexual orientation. Thus, in Pruitt v. Cheney"4 the United
States Court of Appeals considered the claim of an Army Reserve
officer challenging her discharge, which was based on her
homosexuality." 5 The district court had dismissed the case, but
the Ninth Circuit reinstated it and remanded for further proceedings
to determine whether the Army's discrimination is rationally related
to a permissible governmental purpose."' The plaintiff is an
ordained minister who serves as a chaplain, and the existence of
even a rational basis for excluding all homosexuals from such
positions is far from obvious. 7
Steffan v. Cheney..8 provides another illustration of a situation
in which even rational basis review may well dictate the
invalidation of a classification which disadvantages homosexuals.
Steffan was within a few months of graduation from the Naval
Academy when he was discharged for being a homosexual."°9 He
then challenged the blanket exclusion of all gay men and lesbians
from the Navy.110 The district court recently upheld the
regulations barring homosexuals from the military on the basis of
little more than acceptance of the conclusion that "allowing
admitted homosexuals to serve alongside heterosexual members and
officers in the Armed Forces would jeopardize morale, discipline
and the system of rank and command."'"" The court found that
the "quite rational assumption in the Navy is that with no one
present who has a homosexual orientation, men and women alike
can undress, sleep, bathe, and use the bathroom without fear or
not been applied to restrict the activities of the parties challenging the statute. Id at 506-07.
104. 943 F.2d 989 (1991), rehearing en banc denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9812.
105. 943 F.2d at 990.
106. Id. at 996.
107. Plaintiff's prospects are somewhat enhanced by the Ninth Circuit's indication that rational
basis review should constitute a real inquiry into the justifications offered for the discrinination, not
merely a rubber-stamp of approval based on the assertion of some government interest. In this regard,
the court relied on City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
108. 780 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1991).
109. Id at 2-3.
110. Iat2.
111. Id. at 12.
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embarrassment that they are being viewed as sexual objects.
' 11 2
Even rational basis review should be enough to invalidate the total
exclusion of gays from the military, as it is based on nothing more
than such undifferentiated fears that the mere proximity of
heterosexuals and homosexuals will disrupt the operation of the
armed forces.
113
While rational basis review, properly applied, may well be
enough to end the categorical exclusion of homosexuals from the
armed services, and will no doubt be used to invalidate some of the
more blatant forms of official discrimination against homosexuals,
constitutional litigation cannot reasonably be expected to be the
vehicle through which equality is achieved for homosexuals.1
The very issue decided in Hardwick -- that homosexuals are
vulnerable to criminal sanctions under circumstances where
heterosexuals are not -- has a substantial impact, since it often
excludes homosexuals from jobs, such as law enforcement, where
any pattern of statutory violations may be considered disqtialifying.
112. Id at 13.
113. Professor Kenneth L. Karst has argued persuasively that the current exclusion of
homosexuals from the armed forces bears a close resemblance to racial segregation of the military,
which was enforced for many years. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 U.C.LA. L. REv. 499,554-55 (1991). The fears expressed by the Navy are also
substantially undercut by the fact that prior policies had allowed homosexuals to serve, with no
discernible impairment of the Navy's efficiency. The district judge also held that, even though the
Navy never advanced the AIDS epidemic as a justification for the exclusion of homosexuals, the
.. power to protect the Armed Forces from venereal disease is ample to sustain the power to protect
them from what is now known to be a fatal and incurable virus, the HIV." 780 F. Supp. at 13-16.
The court concluded that since a large proportion of those who are infected with HIV are males who
have engaged in homosexual or bisexual activity, it is appropriate to exclude all homosexuals from
the military in order to reduce the risk of infection. The judge fails to note that the military has
already taken strong direct measures to control AIDS, including testing all soldiers for HIV. Legal
Times, March 16, 1992, at 2. It appears doubtful that excluding all homosexuals from the the military
yields any additional benefit, especially since lesbians are the group least likely to contract AIDS,
yet they are also categorically banned from service.
114. Although Hardwick was a hotly-contested 5-4 decision, there is no indication that its
holding is likely to be reconsidered or overruled any time soon. Two of the dissenters, Justices
Brennan and Marshall, have left the Court, and their replacements have not demonstrated any
dissatisfaction with Hardick Justice Powell, who joined in the majority opinion in Hardwick, but
who also wrote a separate concurrence suggesting that actually imprisoning homosexuals for the
conduct involved in Hardwick would raise a serious issue under the eighth amendment, might have
been regarded as a possible fifth vote for a result contrary to that reached in Hardiwick, but he has
also retired from the Court.
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More significantly, the Supreme Court in Hardwick was presented
with the opportunity to dramatically improve the prospects for
equal treatment of homosexuals. That result would have been
accomplished if the Court had done no more than follow through
on the logic of its prior privacy decisions. When the Court refused
to do that, and instead accepted the traditional disapproval of
homosexual activities as a proper justification for continued
discrimination, the main if not the sole responsibility for achieving
equality fell upon other institutions and upon individuals.
Since Hardwick allows but does not require the criminalization
of homosexual activity, the state legislative process can be used to
repeal sodomy statutes and other enactments which overtly
discriminate against homosexuals. In addition, Congress, state
legislatures, and municipalities can act to outlaw discrimination
against homosexuals in employment, housing, education, and
government benefits."' 5 State constitutional law, particularly as it
may establish a right of privacy independent of federal
constitutional principles, may be used to invalidate certain types of
discrimination against homosexuals.
11 6
Against the backdrop of Hardwick, however, all efforts to
secure the equal treatment of homosexuals face substantial
obstacles. The Supreme Court of the United States has limited the
role which federal constitutional law can play in bringing about
equality, and this form of discrimination remains socially
acceptable in a way that racial and gender discrimination have not
been for a long time. Hardwick even broadens the freedom of
action available to those like California's Governor Wilson, who
115. For a useful description of statutory protections granted to homosexuals, as well as a
history of the arduous process by which the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill was enacted in
1989, see Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil
Rights Bill, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.LL. REv. 549 (1991). In February of 1989, the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates adopted a resolution urging the federal government, the states, and
local governments to legislate against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment, housing, and public accommodations. Marcotte, House Affirms Gay Rights, 75 A.B.AJ.
125 (April 1989).
116. For example, on March 11, 1992, the Texas Third District Court of Appeals held that
Penal Code § 21.06, which prohibits homosexual sodomy, violated the Texas Constitution. State v.
Morales. 826 S.W.2d 201, petition for discretionary review dism'd, May 27, 1992.
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express support for the general notion of equality for homosexuals,
while taking steps to perpetuate inequality, secure in the knowledge
that it is extremely unlikely that federal constitutional law will be
brought to bear in the foreseeable future to require that
homosexuals be treated equally with heterosexuals.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick has
helped to perpetuate discrimination against homosexuals. Although
such discrimination has long existed and continues to be manifested
in many ways, Hardwick has at least temporarily chilled efforts to
gain recognition for the right of homosexuals to engage in sexual
intimacies. Perhaps of even greater significance is Hardwick's
apparent acceptance of the appropriateness of societal disapproval
of homosexuals, thus preventing classifications based on sexual
orientation from being measured against a heightened level of
review, as would otherwise be appropriate.
Although discrimination against homosexuals remains subject
to rational basis review under the federal constitution, both the
holding and the tone of Hardwick raise substantial doubts about the
capacity of federal constitutional law to play a major role in the
near future in securing equal treatment for homosexuals. In
Hardwick, the Supreme Court delivered the message that
discrimination against homosexuals has been going on for a long
time and that it is not inconsistent with our constitutional
principles. The main burden of securing immediate progress in
efforts to secure equality for homosexuals now falls upon Congress,
state legislatures, and the state courts.
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